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LIST OF PARTIES
The appellant has not specifically Identified the parties in this
action.
For the purpoes of clarity, The parties are listed below:
1. Appellant/ Petitioner, Henry C. Hopkins, Inmate at the Central
Utah Correctional Facility.
2. Appellee/ Respondent, The UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS.
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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District court
dismissing a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Jurisdiction over this,
appeal, pursuant to U.C.A. § 77-35-26 (2)(a) 1953 as amended and U.C.A.
§ 78-2-2 (3)(h) 1953 as amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Appellant/petitioner contends that the Utah Board of Pardons
is treating his case as a Indeterminate Life Sentence, to
which it is not. Also that the arbitrary decision made by the
Board of Pardons is without reason(s) in departure of his Five
(5) year term of Imprisonment for a first degree felony, set
out by Utah ! s 1983 Legislation, house bill 209, establishing
Mandatory Sentences on first degree sex offenses.
II. Appellant/petitioner contends that the Information used in
his sentenceing phase by the court to determine the actual
term of Imprisonment, is also being used by the Board of
Pardons. And that the reason for given him a rehearing needs
to be more definite in factual Information for such a departure without reason.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a District Court's order for a dismissal of Civil
Habeas Corpus Complaint, for not being Meritorious.
The appellant court must determine whether a proper dismissal is
the case. And if so, the appellant is to give deference to the lower
court on all Issues of fact. Whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, reversing the lower court's finding only when the record
shows that those findings are clearly erroneous or wholly
by the evidence. State v. Michell, 779 P.2d
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d

unsupported

1116,1118 (Utah

1989);

153,154-55 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Nephi City

v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673,674 (Utah 1989); Branam v. Provo School Dist.,
780 P.2d 810,811 (Utah 1989).
(1963).

See: Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293

In Townsend, The supreme court stated, A hearing is required

for Inadequately

developed evidence, this right is limited to cases in

which the lack of evidence was not caused by petitioner's

"Inexcusable

Neglect'/ Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313,317 "Inexcusable Neglect" is, in
turn, defined as petitioner's "Knowing and Intelligent Waiver" of the
right to present the evidence. Id. 317.
IN THE PRESENT CASE
Appellant/petitioner

requested a evidentiary hearing in his petit-

ion to put on evidence to show and prove substantial violations by the
Utah Board of Pardons on September 18, 1991. And that the lower court
denied his Utah Constitutional rights of Habeas Corpus and Due Process,
the court Intentionally sheilded the Board of Pardons arbitrary actions.
STATEMENT OF CASE
On September

18, 1991. Appellant/petioner went before the Utah Board

of Pardons, on a original hearing, after serving three years of his mandatory five (5) year term of Imprisonment, for a mitigating offense of
Sec. 76-5-405. Of the U.C.A. Only to recieve an arbitrary decision by
the board member's in his case.
That the board member's stated that they had in thier possesion a
committment order by the court, for a fifteen (15) years to life and
that his Guidelines was 110 months, because he was in the catagory of
poor. And thus the board members were considering a rehearing in ten
(10) years, with an alienist report to determine whether it would be
appropriate to parole him at that time.
Appellant/petitioner

contested that Information the best he could.

By stating that he should be granted a parole date in September of 1993,
to a halfway House in the salt lake area, for the following reasons;
1) It would not detract from the seriousness of the crime.
2) It would not Jeaperdize the public.
Appellant/petitioner made other allegations, that he was being den
ied due process, in the hearing, that he was not recieveing a full and

fair hearing by three Imparial members, also that the Information
being used was false or fraudulent upon him.
The board member's set his case under advisement. Meanwhile, appellant/petitioner obtained and sent the following legal document(s) (1)
original committment order (2) classification reassesment. the only two
legal documents he could use in his defense, which in turn had a few
defects in them, also a letter stating he had been prujudice by the
board member's that day Sept. 18, 1991.
Appellant/ petitioner recieved a notice from the Board of Pardons
stating, based on the Information submitted to them in the record, by
the appellant/ petitioner. No Change, rehearing in May of 1995.
SUMMARY

ARGUMENT

Because the appellant/ petitioner did not recieve a full and fair
hearing by the Utah Board of Pardons, in that the board members refused
to hold the standards set out by the Utah Supreme Court, in Foote v.
Utah Board of Pardons, 156 Utah adv. rep. 3 (1991). The Supreme Court,
stated:
It is the province of the Judiciary to assure that a claim
of the denial of due process by an arm of Government be heard
and, if Justified, that it be vindicated. What may constitute
due process in any given circumstance may very, but assuredly,
the parole board is not outside the constitutional mandate
that the actions of the Government must afford due process of
Law.
Hatch v. Deland, 790 P.2d 49 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); cf. Andrews
v. Haun, 779 P.2d

229 (Utah

1989).
ARGUMENT

In the present case, appellant/petitioner

also contends that he

has been denied the equal protection of the Law, and thus may constitute
due process in any given circumstance. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.

605, 18 L.Ed 2d 326, 87 S.ct

1209 (1967).

POINT I
Appellant/petitioner contends that the Utah Board of Pardons
is treating his case as a Indeterminate Life sentence, to which
it is not. Also that the arbitrary decision made by the Board
of Pardons is without reason(s) in departure of his five (5)
year term of Imprisonment for a first degree felony, set out by
Utah T s 1983 Legislation, house bill 209, establishing Mandatory
Sentences on first degree sex offenses.
Indeterminate sentence is Invalid where the controlling

statute

prescribes a sentence for a definite term. State ex rel. Nicholson
v. Boles, 148 W va 229, 134 Se 2d 576.
The Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines, 1983-85 Legislation,
house bill209, Appx. H. Where ineffect states:
U.C.A.

1988-89. 76-3-201. Sentencing.

(5)(a) If the statute under which the defendant was convicted
mandates that one of three stated minimum terms shall
be Imposed, the court shall order Imposition of the
term of middle severity unless there are circumstances
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
The Utah Board of Pardons is in conflict with Utah's 1983 Legislation, establishing mandatory sentences, for those convicted of first
degree sex offenses. Similarly,
If mitigating circumstances can be established, the basic mandatory (middle severity) term of ten (10) years, should be reduced to
the five (5) year term. (The truth in sentencing).
The Legislation also stated in house bill 209 states; "The responsibility

to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in

case rests with the Individual Judge." not the board of pardons.
However, The record in appellant/petitioner

sentencing hearing in

State v. Hopkins, Sept. 23, 1988. Togather with relevant

factual Info-

rmation supplied to the Judge, to determine a Just sentence. Indicates
that the Judge found that there was only mitigating circumstances.

And therefore sentence him to the mandatory term of five (5) years,
( which may be for Life o_r to Life ) .
The above statutory language, " which may be for Life err to Life,"
is the operational of house bill 209, in the offense severity

rateings

of the mandatory matrixs, calls for three (3) years for each prior conviction. ( Life, if more then 2 ) prior conviction(s) of the following
violations of; child kidnapping, 76-5-301.1; rape or attempted rape of
child, 76-5-402.1; object rape or attempted object rape of child, 765-402.2; sodomy of child, 76-5-403.1; aggravated sexual abuse of child,
76-5-404.(3); or aggravated sexual assualt, 76-5-405.
The above clearly shows and proves that this

appellant/petitioner

is not on a life sentence, either, indeterminate o_r mandatory. Nor is
he serving additional sentence for prior convictions of the same.
Furthermore, the board of pardons should utilize the guide lines in
all it f s hearings. It should consider the sentence imposed by the Judge
as the minimum term if the sentence is consistent, with the guide lines,
If the sentence differs from the guide-lines, the board should

evaluate

the aggravating and mitigating circumstances noted by the Judge.
If the board feels differently about these circumstances, then the
court, they should notify the court of the reason for the disagreement
and the action taken by the board, (citation original).
The actions of the Board of Pardons to Intentionally to change the
statutory guide lines, that is regulated by the Utah Sentence and Release guide lines and house bill 209 of 1983-85 legislation. To compensate their feelings or belief, is in violation of the ex post facto
clause. Allen v. Hadden, cited as 536 F.Supp. 586 (1982). The Tenth
Circuit Court stated; That a problem arises when the commission changes
the guide lines between the date an offense is committed and the date
of a prisoner parole determination, regulations, like statutes,

are coverd by the ex post facto clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9. cl. 3
Rodriguez v. U.S Parole Commission, 549 F.2d

170,173 ( 7th

Cir.

1979 ) .

In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.ct. 960, 67 L.ED. 2d 17 (1981).
The U.S. Supreme Court, established a two-part test to determine if a
Law is ex post facto: It must be retrospective, that is, it must apply
to events occuring before its enactment, it must disavantage the offender affected by it. Id. 29, 101 S.ct. (citations omitted).
The Law need not, however, Impair a "vested right" to violate the ex
post facto prohibition. Id.
Critical to relief under the ex post facto clause is not
Individual's right to less punishment, but lack of fair
notice and governmental restraint, when the legislature
increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the
crime was consumated.
Id. at 30, 101 S.ct. at 965. Thus, the parole commission may not retrospectively apply a new regulation if the result would be more onerous
to the prisoner. Rodriguez v. U.S. Parole Commission, 594 F.2d at 173
- 76; See: Hayward v. U.S. Parole Commission, 659 F.2d 857- 862 ( 8 t h
Cir. 1981). If the new regulations would have a more onerous effect at
the time he committed the crime(s), the commision must apply the earlier regulation. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,435-36 (1987). The
defendant in Miller, convicted of sexual battery, recieved a seven year
sentence through application of five and one half to seven-year sentenceing range in florida T s newly revised sentencing guide lines. Id.
at 428. previous guide lines effective at the time of defendant's
criminal act provided for a three and one half to four year sentence.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the application of the revised

guide

lines to the defendant change the legal consequences of his act and
thus constituted an ex post facto violation. Id. at 435-36.
IN THE PRESENT CASE

The appellant/petitioner was sentence by the court in strict compliance of house bill 209, of the Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines
1983-85. And that the Utah Board of Pardons cannot abuse Judicial powers
State v. Kelly, cited as 784 P.2d

144 (Utah

1989).

In this Jurisdiction, it is the settled rule that the sentence
Imposed is within the discreation of the trial court, so long
as the sentence dose not exceed the prescribed statutory limits
or the Judge T s authority.
State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988); State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d
984 (Utah 1986); State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d
v. Clark, 632 P.2d

1210 (Utah 1984); State

841 (Utah 1981). We will reverse only for abuse of

that discreation. Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d

547

(1989).

POINT II
II. Appellanat/petitioner contends that the Information used in
his sentenceing phase by the court to determine the actual
term of Imprisonment, is also being used by the Board of
Pardons. And that the reason for given him a rehearing needs
to be more definite in factual Information for such a departure without reason.
Appellant/petitioner

recieved a notice from the board of pardons

in that there was a listing of fourteen (14) aggravating factors used
in determination of there decision. Also that the expiration of his
sentence stated Life, to which it is not; appellant/petitioner

also

states that some of the aggravating factors, have no basis, and he
contends that they do not have material relevancy to them, or to him.
Also some of the aggravated factors are Identical to those use in his
sentenceing phase by the court to determine the actual term of Imprisonment. Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 3; U.S.
v. Miller, 874 F.2d 466,471 ( 7 t h Cir. 1989); In Joost v. U.S. Parole
Commission, 698 F.2d 418,419 ( 1 0 t h Cir. 1983)(per curiam). Parole Commission must furnish more then standard reason to Justify parole denial
that exceeds guide lines and must show good cause for continued

Incarceration. However, many courts prohibit the parole commission
from using factors to Justify exceeding the guide lines recommandations for a parolee if those were used in determining the severity
or salient factor score. Such practice is called "double counting"
and is an Impermissible abuse of discretion. Maddox v. U.S. Parole
Commission, 821 F.2d 997,1002 ( 5 t h Cir. 1987). See: Greenhotz v.
Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corrections, 442 U.S. 1,9-11, 99
S.ct. 2100,2104-2105, L.Ed. 2d 668 (1979). The U.S. Supreme Court
consider a state parole system. The court noted that a parole-rel
ease decision "depends on an amalgam of elements, some of which are
factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisal by the
board members..." Id. at 10, 99 S.ct. at 2105. Although the court
undertook an analysis of statutory language, the majority noted that
[F]our members of this court are of the view that the existance of a
Liberty Interest in parole release is not solely a function of the
wording of the governing statute". Id. at 373 n.3. Justice Marshall,
Brennan, and Stevens have argued that "all prisoners potentially

eli-

gible for parole have a Liberty Interest of which they may not be deprived without due process, regardless of the particular

statutory

language that Implements the parole system." Grenholtz, 442 U.S. at 22
(emphasis in original). Justice Powell has stated that "the presence
of a parole system is sufficient to create a Liberty-Interest, protected by the constitution, in parole-release decision." Id. at 19. See:
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987). In Allen, The Supreme
Court found that the language of the Montana statute governing

parole

eligibility created a protected Liberty Interest. Although the statute
directed that the Board "Shall" release prisoners "When" the criteria
are met, while the statute in Greenholtz stated that prisoners "Shall"

be released "Unless" certain reasons require Imprisonment, the court
saw no difference in the mandatory character of the language.
IN THE PRESENT CASE
Appellant/petitioner request this court to Interpet the mandatory
language of their statutory law of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
Sec. 77-27-9. (2)(a) Parole Proceedings:
Not withstanding any other provisions of Law, a person sentence
to prison for a felony of the first degree Involving... is not
eligible for release on parole by the board of pardons untill
the offender has fully completed serving the minimum mandatory
sentence Imposed by the court.

CONCLUSION
Based upon all the above Information submitted in pro/se to the
Utah Supreme Court, it is hereby requested that this court remand
the appellant/petitioner case to the district court, for relief sought
in his petition.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS NOT REQUESTED.
NO REPLY BRIEF WILL BE FILED IN THIS MATTER.

Dated this Z

day of FEB,.

,1992
HenE7 c. HopTcins

Pro /se
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